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THE NOTION OF DANCING 
JANICE A. RIO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of our most important philosophers believed 
in—if for different reasons—the importance of 
dancing. Socrates took dancing lessons from the famous 
Aspasia, Plato spoke of the uneducated man as 
danceless, and Nietzsche, who mistrusted gods who did 
not dance, recommended dancing in the curriculum of an 
educated man. Even though dancing now flourishes 
perhaps more than ever, analytical philosophers have 
not paid sufficient attention to the aesthetics of 
dancing, and the trickle of articles which have been 
written have been less helpful than one might have 
hoped in clarifying our notion of dancing. In what 
follows I want to set out an analysis of the primary 
use of the expression "x is dancing." Like many 
empirical locutions, "x is dancing" probably will turn 
out not to have a very precise analysis. There will 
be, for example, several different sorts of cases in 
which its application will be problematic; yet, there 
will be a wide range of cases to which every competent 
speaker of English would apply the term. Nevertheless, 
if what x is doing has a sufficient number of 
dancemaking*~features, we are not free to deny that x is 
dancing. Whatever else, for example, may be in 
reasonable dispute about Alica Alouso, that she is 
dancing when she performs Giselle is not open to 
question. 
Contrary to what contemporary avant-garde dancers 
advocate, the expression "x is dancing" cannot be 
applied to just any kind of movement. Avant-garde 
dancers, like other avant-garde artists, believe they 
can incorporate anything they wish into their dancing— 
e.g., suddenly in a dance someone barks out a very good 
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and seriously done dog imitation (Yvonne Rainer once 
did this), or the dancers unexpectedly sit down to take 
an intermission, talking, scratching, and the like 
(Cunningham once did this). Aileen Passloff once did a 
solo called Asterisk in which she simply walked briskly 
around the stage in heels and a dress. If many of the 
avant-garde productions are accepted as genuine cases 
of dancing, we will have to surrender distinctions 
which seem at least intuitively correct. We could not, 
for example, distinguish between merely repetitious 
movement (e.g., hammering a nail, rowing a boat, etc.) 
and dance movement, between dance movement and 
kaleidoscopic movement where there is constant change 
but no progression, or between fragmented or spastic 
movement—step, pause and jerk, step, pause and jerk— 
and dance movement. We need not demand of contemporary 
dancers that they adhere to traditional aesthetic 
canons which now seem passe, but we can demand they 
surrender an almost vacuous use of the term. 
I am not at this point going to settle the question 
of what sort of analysis to use; rather, I am going to 
assume the relationship between the analysans and 
analysandum is one of logical necessity and sufficiency 
because this best illuminates the problems inherent in 
analysizing the locution. After this I will outline a 
plausible alternative, one suggested to me by Peter 
Achinsteinls work on semantic and nonsemantic 
relevance. Achinstein holds that for certain terms 
the relationship between the properties cited in the 
analysans and analysandum is one of relevance. If a 
property is relevant for being an x, then given that an 
item possesses certain properties and lacks others in 
such a way that it is a candidate for being an x, the 
fact that the item possesses (or lacks) the property in 
question normally will count, at least to some extent, 
in favor of (or against) concluding that it is an x; 
and if it possesses (or lacks) sufficiently many 
properties of certain sorts, the fact that the item 
possesses (or lacks) the property in question may 
justifiably be held to settle whether it is an x. For 
example, consider the Black Swan pas de deux. The fact 
that Odile possesses the property of moving 
rhythmically to Tchaikovsky's music normally counts, at 
least to some extent, in favor of concluding that she 
is dancing. 
II. THE COMMON SENSE VIEW: ITS MERITS AND DEMERITS 
To begin with, dancing requires a medium, the 
medium of bodily movement. A person who does not move 
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cannot be said, in any sense of the term, to be 
dancing. This does not imply a person need be moving 
at all times during his dance. Just as a musician 
makes use of musical rests, so a dancer makes use of 
movement rests. Furthermore, it is important that the 
dancer travel through space while moving his body. 
Similarly, this does not imply the dancer never stays 
in one place, only that over the interval of his dance, 
he normally covers some space. It is hard to say how 
much space the dancer has to cover, but if he stands in 
one place over the interval of his dance, normally he 
cannot be said to be dancing, though he might be said 
to be e.g., hopping, turning or jumping. Even a waltz 
done sur la place would not be a case of dancing, 
though it would be an instance of doing a waltz step. 
Although all dancing involves movement, not all 
movement is dance movement, just as all music involves 
sound, but not all sound is music. Since movement is 
fundamental to dancing and since dancing has leaned 
heavily on music, we might try the following analysis: 
(1) x is dancing over interval i if and only 
If (i) x moves rhythmically In accordance 
with music played during i and (ii) x 
travels through space. 
By use of the vague expression "in accordance with," I 
wish to bring out the relationship of dancing to music 
is itself in need of analysis. To discuss the issue 
adequately would take me too far afield; yet because it 
is important, I must pause to comment on it. It is 
tempting to think, along with Balanchine, H'Doubler 
and a host of others, that dancing is a visual 
interpretation of instrumental music in which dance 
movements are united with the music by sharing its 
rhythmic structure and overall emotive qualities. The 
problem with this account is that counter-examples are 
not difficult to find. For instance, in Le Jeune Homme 
et la Mort Roland Petit juxtaposes violent choreography 
against Bach's tranquil Passacaglia and in Rainforest 
Cunningham pitches lyrical choreography against 
Feldman*s non-rhythmic and non-melodic continuum of 
orchestral sounds. Whatever kind of music 
choreographers choose, their options today as to the 
rhythmic and emotional relationship between music and 
dancing are wide open. 
The analysis has several unwanted consequences. 
First, it rules out free dance (which presumably we 
want to call dance) wherein dance movement is freed 
from its dependence on instrumental or vocal music. To 
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emphasize aurally the visible rhythm of bodily 
movements, the dancer often resorts to stamping his 
feet, clapping his hands, or slapping parts of his 
body. In the second place, the analysis rules out 
dancing done in silence, such as Jerome Robbin's Moves, 
Doris Humphrey's Water Study and David Linchine's La 
Creation. Although dancing has leaned heavily on 
instrumental music and presumably will continue to do 
so, perhaps because melodic and harmonic tones are 
imbued with emotive qualities which provide an 
atmospheric mood, rhythmic accompaniment theoretically 
is not necessary. 
The analysis is also faulty because ice skating is 
not correctly classifiable as dancing though it has the 
properties cited in the analysans. I do not contend 
that conceptually dancing cannot be done on ice; a 
person dressed in ordinary street shoes, fortified with 
a lot of nerve and blessed with a bit of luck could 
whirl off a Viennese waltz on ice. But I do contend 
that ice skating is not dancing, despite the fact that 
it shares some qualities, e.g., lightness, smoothness 
and similiar use of meter, with some kinds of dancing. 
The reason for this is that basic to the notion of 
dancing is the notion of stepping (generic sense, i.e., 
general term for running, hopping, leaping, turning, 
etc.) from one foot to the other. Consider again the 
Viennese waltz which has a basic step pattern of down, 
up, u p — a reach with two catch steps. Once a person 
puts on ice skates, he can no longer do the basic step 
pattern but must change it to three gliding steps, and 
in doing this he draws not from the dancer's 
fundamental repertoire of steps but from the skater's. 
In dancing stepping from one foot to another is the 
foundation from which step patterns are built, while in 
ice skating the foundation lies with gliding from one 
foot to another. To be sure skaters use a few stepping 
motions such as running on toe, but they use them 
sparingly and can rarely use them extensively. 
Consider, further, the following facts about 
dancing and ice skating. They are listed in 
directories such as the telephone book under separate 
categories. Dance critics do not review skating 
performances, except maybe to pinch hit at the last 
moment for someone who has taken ill. Similarly, Dance 
Magazine, Dance Observer and other dance periodicals do 
not report on ice skating events. Universities offer 
advanced degrees in dancing as they do in music but not 
in ice skating or football. Dance competitions such as 
the Varna do not accept ice skaters. Practices such as 
these bring out, though they do not prove, that the 
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categories under which we classify these activities are 
exclusive. 
Consider, also, Ashton's Les Patineurs. Through 
the use of superb stagecraft and dramatic setting, 
Ashton shows us how dancing may be like ice skating. 
In a series of none divvertissements, he creates a 
style of movement authentically suggesting the 
accidents and acrobatics of ice skaters. Every step 
and stance is rigidly controlled in the characteristic 
stiff-thighed and straight-backed glide of ice skaters 
and is bounced off a slowly accelerating, rippling 
rhythm of skaters building up speed. Even though Les 
Patineurs is very much like ice skating, it is not on 
this account dance skating, since it is not sufficient 
for the truth of "Les Patineurs is dance skating" that 
dance skating resembles ice skating. 
It might be objected that ice dancing threatens 
trouble for my argument. But I contend to say that ice 
dancing is a form of dancing is like saying narrative 
dancing is a form of drama. Both use the elements of 
story-telling and expressive bodily movement. However, 
whereas in drama narration through voice control js the 
basic aesthetic category, in dancing the quality of the 
movement takes aesthetic precedence. Again, in drama 
bodily movement is an aid, however invaluable, to 
expressive interpretation of words, but in narrative 
dancing the story, however important, is secondary to 
expressive bodily movement. Even though dance drama 
eans heavily on the elements of drama, we do not, 
thereby, call it a form of drama. Similarly, even 
though ice dancing borrows from the elements of 
dancing, it is not, thereby, a form of dancing. 
Furthermore, ice dancing cannot without difficulty, 
adapt basic dance steps to the ice medium, nor, when 
successful, can it sustain them for any length of time. 
Moreover, although dancing can be performed without the 
use of gliding steps, ice dancing cannot, except 
perhaps in very simple cases. Again, although ice 
dancing can be performed without the use of dance 
steps, dancing cannot, not even in the simplest cases. 
In light of the above considerations, I think ice 
dancing is more properly classified as skating which is 
a bit like dancing than dancing which is a lot like 
skating. 
In general the problem with the above analysis is 
that though it initially accords well with out 
intuitions, it fails because there are just too many 
counter-examples. Another objection is that the 
analysis neglects important descriptive features of 
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dancing. In the literature on dancing, no discussion 
is complete without an account of the expressive and 
representative elements of dancing; yet, they make no 
appearance in the analysis. 
III. THE NOTION OF RELEVANCE 
I want to suggest that the relationship between the 
properties cited in the analysans and analysandum is 
one of relevance, where properties relevant to dancing 
are characteristic of many kinds of dancing. Perhaps 
the best way to explain this is by comparison with the 
term "religion." The property of believing in 
supernatural beings (gods) is relevant though neither 
logically necessary nor sufficient for being a 
religion. If a cultural entity exhibits certain other 
properties (e.g., prayer and ritual), the fact that it 
includes belief in supernatural beings will normally 
count, to some extent, in favor of concluding that it 
is a religion (though possession of other properties 
may count against this). And if it possesses 
sufficiently many properties of certain sorts, the fact 
that it includes belief in supernatural beings might be 
taken to settle the matter. If it does not include 
such a belief, it is not necessarily excluded from 
being a religion. However, the fact that a cultural 
entity lacks belief in supernatural beings will 
normally count as some reason against concluding that 
it is a religion; and if it lacks certain other 
properties as well, this fact may be taken to settle 
the question. 
We need, moreover, to distinguish between, 
semantically and descriptively relevant properties. 
Suppose we are asked to justify the claim that someone 
who is moving rhythmically to the beat of the music 
while traveling through space is dancing. I would 
reply that such properties tend to count in and of 
themselves, to some extent, toward classifying someone 
as dancing. As a matter of fact, someone who is moving 
this way is normally classified as dancing solely in 
virtue of having such properties. They are among the 
ones which constitute a final court of appeal when 
considering matters of classification, and such 
properties, we might say, are intrinsically dance-
making ones. Suppose, on the other hand, we are asked 
to justify the claim that someone in an enchanted 
forest, on the stage of Covent Garden, who is acting 
like a swan, is dancing. Among the possible replies is 
that such properties do not tend to count, in and of 
themselves, toward someone being classified as 
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dancing—that is, it is not true that someone is 
classified as dancing solely in virtue of having such 
properties. These properties do not constitute a final 
court of appeal when considering matters of 
classification. They are not intrinsically dance-
making ones. Rather, the possession of such properties 
(among others) counts in favor of classifying someone 
as dancing if they are found to be among other 
properties which are intrinsically dance-making ones. 
The distinction between semantic and descriptive 
relevance can be expressed by saying: Given that x is 
a candidate for an instance of dancing, a property is 
semantically relevant for "x is dancing" provided that 
x's having (or lacking) that property tends to count in 
and of itself, to some extent, toward (or against) an x 
is dancing classification. On the other hand, given 
that x is a candidate for an instance of dancing, a 
property is descriptively relevant for "x is dancing" 
provided that x's having that property tends to count 
toward an x is dancing classification solely because it 
occurs along with the semantic properties. 
IV. THE SEMANTIC AND DESCRIPTIVE PROPERTIES OF DANCING 
I will develop the distinction between semantical 
and descriptive relevance by looking at a typical and 
familiar case of dancing, Swan Lake; and asking whether 
lack of P in and of itself counts, to some extent, 
against classifying what the dancers are doing as 
dancing. In virtue of lacking P, do we think of what 
they are doing as not the best examples of dancing, not 
the most typical or standard instances of dancing. 
Somethimes whether lack of P counts at all against 
classifying what someone is doing as an instance of 
dancing may not be definitely answerable. However, 
when we have all the properties in the set, we clearly 
have an instance of dancing (e.g., Sleeping Beauty, 
Romeo and Juliet, Cinderella, etc.), just as when none 
of the properties are in the set, we clearly have an 
instance of nondancing (e.g., playing football, baking 
a cake, watching television, etc.). But in between 
cases will arise in which we will hesitate to say 
whether they are dancing, and this may be the 
reasonable reply. 
In light of the above discussion, I will list what 
seem to me to be the semantic and descriptive features 
of "x is dancing": 
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x uses a medium of bodily movement which allows 
x to step from one foot to another. Although 
this is a semantic condition, the medium of 
bodily movement, by itself, is necessary. 
x's movement lasts for some substantial 
Tnterval i. Although occurring over an 
interval is a necessary and semantic condition, 
the length of the interval is contingent. 
x travels through a space s. Similarly, while 
occurring in space is a necessary and semantic 
condition, the amount of space covered is 
contingent. 
x uses rhythmical bodily movement either (a) in 
accordance with or (b) in coexistence with a 
musical or other auditory accompaniment. This 
is a semantic condition because if, for 
example, the Swan Queen Odette were to continue 
what she was doing in silence, this would 
count, to some extent, against classifying what 
she was doing as dancing. She would, however, 
still be dancing because what she is doing has 
sufficiently many other properties. 
By contrast the following conditions are 
descriptively relevant for dancing because it 
is not true that someone is classifiable as 
dancing solely in virtue of having these 
properties: 
x uses movement of the sort which is expressive 
of emotions or feelings. 
x moves with dynamic variation. Dynamics 
provide the texture of movements, i.e., smooth 
and sharp plus gradations in tension (e.g., 
slow-smooth with force, fast-smooth without 
tension, fast-sharp with tension, etc.). 
x uses choreographed movement. 
x uses occupational gesture. Occupational 
gesture in its simplest form includes those 
movements made by people at work and play, 
e.g., the embroidery of the Young Girl in The 
Rake's Progress, the spinning of Giselle in the 
ballet of the same name, etc. 
x uses pantomine. Conventional, pantomimic 
gestures stand in the place of speech and are 
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found in the scenes d*action of ballets such as 
Swan Lake, The Sleeping Beauty and the dance-
dramas of the Orient. 
10. x uses movement accompanied by a narrator. 
11. x uses costuming. 
12. x uses scenery. 
These properties are also subject to variations in 
degree. For example, if x uses rhythmical 
bodily movement in accordance with the music 
for the entire duration of his dance, condition 
four is satisfied; if for no time, it is not 
satisfied. For times in between there will be 
some for which it will be unclear whether the 
condition is satisfied. 
V. SUMMARY 
Although the above overview has been sketchy, it 
presents a modest attempt to clarify our concept of 
dancing. I began by showing that the most popular 
analysis of dancing—the one which takes it to be 
rhythmical bodily movement done to music—is inadequate 
because it lets in ice skaters and rules out free dance 
and dancing in silence. Without arguing fully for the 
point, I have suggested that basic to the notion of 
dancing is stepping from one foot to another while 
basic to the notion of skating is gliding from one foot 
to another. Furthermore, I pointed out that an 
analysis of this sort fails to do full justice to the 
richness of our concept of dancing. 
The main thrust of the discussion has been to 
outline a plausible alternative, one which takes the 
relationship between the properties cited in the 
analysans and analysandum to be one of relevance. Of 
these, some are semantically relevant, others 
descriptively relevant. Although much more needs to be 
said on the subject, the above serves to indicate the 
direction we might take to unsnarl some of the tangles 
involved in the aesthetics of dancing. 
University of Nebraska 
255 
NOTES 
In this use x ranges over persons, whereas in 
derivative uses x ranges over other objects, when, for 
example, we speak of gnats dancing in the air or 
marionettes dancing with human grace. Moreover, I 
shall not be concerned with dances of animals such as 
the mountain chickens of British Guiana, stilt birds of 
Cape York, Australia, or anthropoid apes of Teneriffe. 
Since secondary senses of the expression (save those 
that are obviously metaphorical) can be analyzed in 
terms of its primary sense or can be considered an 
extension of it, I shall confine my analysis to its 
primary sense. Moreover, even though we cannot rule 
out nonhuman rational beings among those objects 
capable of dancing, I do not think they should be 
mentioned in the primary analysis. Should we be 
visited someday by dancing Martians or the like, I 
suggest we then extend the use of the concept to 
countenance these creatures. 
2 . Peter Achinstein, Concepts of Science (Baltimore, 
Maryland, 1968), pp. 1-66. 
3 
See George Balanchine, Balanchine's New Complete 
Stories of the Great Ballets, ed. Francis Mason (Garden 
City, New York, 1968), pp. 465 and 466, and Margaret 
H'Doubler, "Dance and Movement," _The Dance 
Experience, ed. Myron Howard and Constance Gwen Nadel 
(New York, 1970), pp. 189-96. 
4 
For a discussion of the analysis of "religion," 
see William P. Alston, Philosophy of Language 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), pp. 84-9. 
5 
In what follows I rely heavily on Achinstein's 
notion of relevance. 
